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In Memoires for Paul de Man and the eulogies
collected in The Work of Mourning, Derrida has
taught us how to deal with the loss of one we
love through an ongoing conversation, a future-
oriented engagement with their words and
thought: ‘Such a turn to the friend is all we
have to give, and we turn not as already consti-
tuted beings … but in an offer to remake our-
selves’.1 We are ‘the heirs of questions’, of
reading and rereading, analysing and question-
ing.2 In The Last Interview there is a brief ref-
erence to the occasion (the lastness) of the
interview—‘you can just say it’, Derrida says,
‘very seriously ill, and undergoing a very
aggressive treatment’. (22) However, whenever
the interviewer raises ‘last things’, Derrida talks
about his ongoing engagement with a certain
ethos of writing and his love of language as
habitus, the necessity of saying what must be
said no matter what, the importance of the uni-
versity as a place that must organise its search
for truth without any conditions attached, and
the pressing need for an ‘alter-globalist’ world.
It is as though he is setting us our homework
for the years to come.
Referring back to the opening words of
Spectres of Marx—‘I would like to learn to live
finally’—Birnbaum asks Derrida where he is
today with regard to this desire ‘to know how
to live’. Derrida’s response is to situate that
desire in its context—his concern in 1993 with
a ‘new international’: ‘Beyond “cosmopolitan-
ism”, beyond the notion of a “world citizen”,
beyond a new world nation-state, even beyond
the logic of … political “parties”’. (22) These
are the ‘alter-globalist imperatives in which I
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believe’ which would require ‘a large number of
mutations in international law and in all the
organizations that establish world order (IMF,
WTO, the G8, and especially the United
Nations and its Security Council’, whose
charter, forces of intervention, composition,
and ‘first of all its location—as far away as poss-
ible from New York City’ would have to be
changed’. (23) As for the intended question, his
answer is ‘no, I never learned-to-live’ for that
would mean learning to die and quite simply,
‘I have never learned to accept it, to accept
death, that is’: ‘I remain uneducable when it
comes to any kind of wisdom about knowing-
how-to-die or, if you prefer, knowing-how-
to-live. I still have not learned or picked up
anything on this subject.’ (25) Rather like
Nietzsche, who regarded death as irrelevant to
one’s life and work, Derrida skilfully steers the
interview back to his ongoing engagement with
the contemporary world which is ‘more inegali-
tarian than ever, for millions and millions of
living beings—human or not—who are denied
their basic rights’.
Birnbaum inquires about the legacy of the
generation of writers and thinkers of whom
Derrida is virtually the last. Derrida’s response
is to foreground an ‘ethos of writing and of
thinking, an intransigent or indeed incorrupt-
ible ethos (Hélène Cixous calls us the “incor-
ruptibles”), without any concession even to
philosophy, an ethos that does not let itself be
scared off by what public opinion, the media,
or the phantasm of an intimidating readership
might pressure one to simplify or repress’. (27)
This is an obligation which unites the members
of his generation and the entire milieu that sup-
ported them. He violently asserts the necessity
of waging ‘an unrelenting war against doxa,
against those who are today called “media intel-
lectuals”, against a general discourse that has
been preformatted by media powers that are
themselves in the hands of certain politico-
economic, editorial and academic lobbies’. (28)
This is why, he attests, he continues to talk
about Bourdieu, Lacan, Deleuze and Foucault.
His dialogue with these thinkers is an effort to
preserve and inject into the future their ideas
and debates. All of these thinkers—as well as
many others from the Bible to Plato, Kant,
Marx, Freud, Heidegger, who ‘form a part of this
little “me” that they exceed on all sides’ (30):
To ask me to renounce what formed me,
what I’ve loved so much, what has been my
law, is to ask me to die. In this fidelity there
is a sort of instinct for self-preservation. To
renounce … some difficult formulation,
some complication, paradox, or sup-
plementary contradiction, because it is not
going to be understood … is for me an
unacceptable obscenity. (30)
Derrida’s idea of mourning as a future-oriented
devotion to the infinite alterity of the other and
to the far away within us strongly resembles the
predominant idea of love discussed in Linnell
Secomb’s book, whether it is Nietzsche’s ‘joint
longing for the unknown, the undiscovered’
(30) or Irigaray’s ‘mediation which never
reaches a static conclusion and is always in the
process of becoming’. (14) Philosophy and Love:
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From Plato to Popular Culture is an appealing,
immensely readable book that examines con-
cepts of love in Plato, Nietzsche, de Beauvoir,
Levinas, Fanon, Irigaray, Barthes, Butler,
Foucault, Derrida and Nancy, along with some-
times unlikely bedfellows: Sappho, Franken-
stein, Desperate Housewives, She Came to Stay,
Hiroshima Mon Amour, Night Cries, Jedda,
Orlando, You’ve Got Mail, weddings by Fluxux
Art and www.loveartlab.org, and Dogville
respectively. Drawing on Derrida’s idea of ‘an
attempt to blur the borders between literature
and philosophy … in the name of hospitality’,
Secomb succeeds in creating congeniality
between these disparate discourses. (5) Each
chapter interleaves an account of the philos-
ophical text with that of the cultural text,
moving backwards and forwards between the
two, simultaneously introjecting the voices of
other critics and philosophers into the mix,
making for a richly textured experience.
The concepts of love range from Plato’s view
of love as a seeking of wisdom to Nietzsche’s
‘star friendship’ in which two separate beings
share a joint longing for the distant unknown,
to Levinas’ placing the love relation (the face-
to-face encounter) at the centre of ethics and
sociality, to Barthes’s idea of love as ‘retro-
spective fabulation’. (2) The chapters on de
Beauvoir and Fanon ground us in the material
conditions of our loving. Beauvoir discusses
woman’s way of being in the world with an
emphasis on the importance of freedom, equal-
ity and mutual recognition, arguing that sexual
inequality arises from repeated, larger and
smaller acts of aggression and oppression
which have become habitualised and normal-
ised through endless reiteration. Fanon prob-
lematises the issues of transcendence, equality
and freedom in a postcolonial context. Nancy
recommends our shattering and opening to the
other as an integral part of community while
Derrida argues for friendship with the stranger
as central to the health of the democracy to
come.
Secomb points out that The Symposium, ‘per-
haps the most enduring and influential philos-
ophical reflection on love’, describes not only
the experience of love but also the passions of
the mind, revealing a link between the erotics
of sexuality and philosophical inquiry. (10)
Love is also related to creativity; finding a com-
patible other may lead to a child or to ‘the fame
associated with creative productions’ though in
Plato ‘creative production results from intimate
relations between men’. (13) Though the
Platonic idea of love with its ladder leading
from the lower form of individual love of a par-
ticular beloved to a higher form of love of the
good and the beautiful in general has domi-
nated Western philosophy, Secomb argues that
Platonic love has always suggested ‘a more
complex entwining in which philosophic and
erotic seduction are thoroughly enmeshed’.
(23) ‘Love is the movement toward, rather than
the final attainment of abstract and particular
beauty.’ Secomb also discusses Irigaray’s em-
phasis on ‘the intermediary role of love’, ‘a
mediation never reaching a static conclusion
and always in the process of becoming’. (14)
Irigaray argues that in Plato’s tying love to pro-
creation and immortality ‘love loses its daimonic
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character’—‘its divinity, its mediastic, alchemi-
cal qualities’: ‘A sort of teleological triangle is
put in place instead of a perpetual journey … a
permanent becoming’. (15)
In the chapter on Nietzsche and Franken-
stein, Secomb cites Nietzsche’s denigration of
love as ‘avarice’, ‘a lust for possession’, and ‘the
most ingenious expression of egotism’ (29) as
well as his privileging of a concept of love as 
a longing for the distant and the unknown.
Nietzsche also suggests that ‘through egoism
love has the potential to create a bond based on
a shared desire for the new’, ‘a joint longing for
the unknown, the undiscovered, the new and
different’. (30) This friendship founded on a
mutual desire for a passionate life ‘beyond the
mundane ordinary life of the masses’ Nietzsche
calls star friendship. (31)
In ‘Simone de Beauvoir’s Desperate House-
wives’ Secomb argues that de Beauvoir’s in-
sistence on the significance of freedom, equality
and mutual recognition in the love relationship
challenges theories of love founded on self-
sacrifice, boundless generosity, and the uncon-
ditional bestowal of love. In The Second Sex de
Beauvoir explains how historically women have
been confined to a life of immanence: ‘Her
body is not perceived as the radiation of a sub-
jective personality, but as a thing sunk deeply in
its own immanence; it is not for such a body to
have reference to the rest of the world, it must
not be the promise of things other than itself; it
must end the desire it arouses’. (46) However,
women’s reproductive role is ‘not the origin or
cause but rather a justification for the exclusion
of women’. (45) De Beauvoir also argues, in
terms that Secomb makes brilliantly relevant to
Desperate Housewives, that ‘having turned to
man, as the means to attain ersatz tran-
scendence, woman then becomes both a slave
and a tyrant in the sexual relation’. (49) More-
over, if the man to whose transcendence she
has allied herself does not live up to her un-
realistic idealisation, ‘he must be trampled on’.
(50) However, de Beauvoir’s account does allow
for ‘a genuine experience of love in which each
lover would approach the other from a position
of equal freedom—and each would recognise
the freedom of the other’ and each ‘could move
towards transcendence, could engage with and
transform the world and remain open to new,
different and transforming futures’. (51)
Chapter 4 on Levinas discusses both the love
relation of the face-to-face encounter and erotic
love which intertwines carnality with responsi-
bility thereby going beyond both self and other
toward a future, which may be a child or a
movement toward future transcendence. For
Levinas, ‘human sociality rests on recognizing
the demand for care, generosity and selfless
love, conveyed in the face-to-face encounter’.
(59) In his conceptualisation, we offer to the
other our plenitude: ‘We are nourished by our
encounter with the world’, we experience
enjoyment and love of life; there is ‘a love of the
world that forms the basis for love of, or
responsibility, for others’. (60) Secomb also dis-
cusses Levinas’s concept of home or dwelling
place which facilitates our ability to act on 
and transform the world (60) as well as de
Beauvoir’s and Irigaray’s critiques of Levinas’s
representation of the feminine.
In chapter 5, ‘Colonial Love in Fanon and
Moffatt’, Secomb explores Fanon’s and Moffatt’s
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problematising of ‘our romancing of individual
inter-racial love stories’ and the ‘humanist,
benevolent love, used in the service of colonial
conquest’. (77) For Fanon, transcendence is
central to human subjectivity, but transcen-
dence cannot be given. Self-consciousness is
attained not through recognition by others but
through self creation, asserting the value of
one’s identity and culture. In his chapters on
inter-racial love Fanon problematises the pol-
itics of recognition. Secomb discusses critiques
of Fanon by Homi Bhabha (Fanon obscures the
importance of the other in the construction 
of both individual subjectivity and cultural
identity) and Rey Chow, who interrogates the
positioning of woman in the postcolonial com-
munity that Fanon envisages, arguing that ‘he
is threatened by the future transgressive cross-
ing of boundaries implied by women becoming
active agents in this postcolonial community
formation’. (87) Secomb also discusses the
importance of the depiction of singer Jimmy
Little in Night Cries, a film which gestures
toward a more complex account of culture in
which the colonised are not simply assimilated
but are rather active agents in the creation of a
hybrid community. (92)
In chapter 6 Secomb argues that Irigaray
redirects the gift of love by inventing the phrase
‘I love to you’ which creates space and air, and
preserves distance and difference—in contrast
to ‘I love you’ which implies ownership or con-
trol and risks turning the beloved into the
object of my affection. (99) In conclusion,
Secomb writes: ‘Irigaray’s I Love To You facili-
tates an indirection that thwarts possession and
closure and enables an openness to the other-
ness of the other for “it is the surprise, the un-
knowability, the otherness of the other that
open and maintain the transformative and
futural vector of relationality”’. (109)
In chapter 7, Barthes’s A Lovers Discourse is
examined alongside the Tom Hanks and Meg
Ryan film You’ve Got Mail. For Barthes, love is a
kind of script; a lover’s discourse arises from the
‘memory of the sites, books, encounters, where
such and such a thing had been read, spoken,
heard’ suggesting that love is but the perform-
ative re-enactment of lover’s discourses. (122)
The chapter on Butler and Foucault
‘Que(e)rying Marriage’ examines Butler’s re-
definition of kinship as ‘an “enacted practice”
through which dependents are nurtured and
cared for’ (130), thus challenging the idea that
children can only be nurtured in normative
heterosexual or same sex marriage. Secomb
points out that ‘while Foucault rejects conven-
tional family institutions he nevertheless
acknowledges the importance of loving re-
lations’ and suggests that ‘same-sex marriage
has not only the potential to acknowledge the
love between men … but also in the process to
reinvent the meanings, and significance and
practice of marriage’. (137) Secomb concludes
that if Foucault is right that ‘it is love, not sex,
between men, that is disturbing, then marriage
as a symbol of love may disrupt dominant dis-
courses about male homosexuality’. (137) The
chapter ends with an account of marriages per-
formed by the Fluxus Art Performance Group
and love.art.lab.
The chapter on Derrida and Nancy brings
out the significance of love in the formation 
of subjectivity, community and culture. For
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Nancy, thinking itself is love and ‘It is love that
inaugurates the becoming of the singular
being’. (143)
Love is an opening of the subject to the
other so that the subject is from that
moment, that is to say from the outset,
shattered … From then on, I is constituted
broken … As soon as there is love, the
slightest act of love, the slightest spark,
there is this ontological fissure that cuts
across and that disconnects the elements of
the subject-proper—the fibres of its heart.
One hour of love is enough, one kiss alone,
provided it is out of love and can there in
truth be any other kind? (145)
In Secomb’s words: ‘Love shatters the atomistic
being introducing alterity into the heart of
being.’ (146) Nancy distinguishes himself from
Levinas, arguing that ‘all forms of love facilitate
the ethical relation of responsibility as all
expose us to the sociality of existence’. (147)
The discussion of Derrida focuses on The Pol-
itics of Friendship which proposes ‘that it is
friendship with the stranger that is the “star
friendship”’ and calls for an ‘“indefinitely per-
fectible” democracy “to come” that exceeds
fraternal exclusions of the sister and cousin, the
feminine and racial/cultural other’. (151)
In the conclusion, Secomb suggests that
perhaps the subtext of the book has been ‘that
philosophy is love of thinking, but that think-
ing itself is love’. Philosophy is ‘a fascination, an
infatuation, with thinking’: ‘Philosophy plays
with thought, invents concepts, speculates,
ruminates and investigates. It is not closure or
completion but unending intrigue.’ Similarly
love is ‘an incompletion, mediation’, a ‘move-
ment between lack and completion’. (157)
Moreover, Secomb writes: ‘stories and literature
participate in and share with love and phil-
osophy the structure of mediation, deferral,
unendingness and even of unworking’. (158)
‘All three unravel finality, stasis, closure and
totality.’ (162) The only thing I missed in this
thoroughly engaging book was Kristeva’s Tales
of Love with its baroque psycho-philosophical
account of the exhilaration of the ‘I’ in love,
poised at the borders of narcissism and
idealisation:
Love is the time and space in which ‘I’
assumes the right to be extraordinary. Sov-
ereign yet not individual. Divisible, lost,
annihilated; but also through imaginary
fusion with the loved one, equal to the in-
finite space of superhuman psychism.
Paranoid? I am, in love, at the zenith of
subjectivity.3
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